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courts reject the rule that federal law is applicable x" and hold that
state law is controlling." 6 Under this majority view the situs of the
property right against unfair competition is of major importance. It
would seem that the trademark concept of an independent situs should
cases, at least until unfair competition
be applied in unfair competition
7
is federally treated."
Conclusion
There does not seem to be a basis for serious dissent to uniform
protection of intangible property rights. Protection of intangibles as
property has a sound foundation in natural justice, and expanding
commerce necessitates uniformity in treatment. The obvious solution
is universal uniformity achieved through international legislation. In
that connection, the Universal Copyright Convention could serve as a
model for the attainment of such an objective. Until practical political
objections can be overcome, however, a norm for the solution of conflict of laws problems must be adopted. Situs is a norm, if situs is
universally applied with consistency. A recapitulation of the laws
governing real intangible property will show that intangibles are
closely allied with tangible, readily-located property; a copyright is
allied with a book it protects, good-will with a business and an idea
with its concrete plan. Perhaps the situs of a real intangible can be
considered to be the situs of its natural, physical ally. It is only in
reliance on tangibles that the disharmonizing fiction of intangible situs
can be limited if not eliminated.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

-

"FEDERAL"

OR "NATIONAL"?

Introduction
In Rea v. United States,' the defendant had been indicted in a2
federal district court for the unlawful acquisition of marihuana.
v. Casco Products Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
913 (1952).
115 See Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947).
116 National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499
(D. Mass. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1944) ; see Swarthmore Classics.
Inc. v. Swarthmore Junior, 81 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) ; Folmer Graflex
Corp. v. Graphic Photo Service, 44 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mass. 1940).
11 Such federal control is advocated in Note, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1323

(1947).

1350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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Because federal agents had obtained the narcotics under an invalid
search warrant, defendant's motion to suppress its use as evidence was
granted. However, since it was contraband the evidence was not
returned. 3 After dismissal of the indictment, the federal agent instigated a criminal action against Rea in New Mexico, alleging violation of that state's narcotics law. 4 Pending this action, the defendant
sought an injunction in a federal district court to prevent the agent
from testifying in the state court with respect to the unlawfully seized
narcotics. Denial of his motion was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit.5 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, stated that the case
presented ".

.

. no problem concerning the interplay of the Fourth

and the Fourteenth Amendments nor the use which New Mexico
might make of the evidence." 6 He further pointed out that the court
had not been asked to in any way "interfere with state agencies in
enforcement of state law." 7 Thus viewed, the question involved in
the case was limited to the supervisory powers of the Court over federal officers. The Court found that the agent had violated the Federal
Rules governing searches and seizures 8 which are designed to protect
a citizen's privacy. The injunction was granted because it was felt
that "that policy is defeated if . . . [a] federal agent can flout . . .
[the Federal Rules] and use the fruits of his unlawful act either in
federal or state proceedings." 9
The expression of these views by Mr. Justice Douglas conformed
10
to those set forth in his dissent in Stefanelli v. Minard. There, he
noted that:
To hold first that . . . evidence may be admitted and second that its use may
an empty and hollow guarnot be enjoined is to make the Fourth Amendment
11
antee so far as state prosecutions are concerned.

In the Stefanelli case the Court refused to intervene in a New Jersey
criminal proceeding. The petitioner there was denied an injunction
forbidding the use of evidence obtained through an unlawful search
by state officers. It was felt that this conclusion was necessary to
preserve the delicate balance between state and nation, since arbitrary
use of the federal equity power would serve to centralize power and
upset our federal system of government.
328 U.S.C. § 2463 (1952); 53 STAT. 282 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § 2598 (1952);
R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
4N.M. STAT. ANN. § 71-636 (1941).
5 Rea v. United States, 218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954), rev'd, 350 U.S. 214
(1956), 41 VA. L. Rzv. 662 (1955).
6 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216 (1956).

FED.

7Ibid.
8

See FFD. R. CRIm. P. 41(c).
9 Rea v. United States, stpra note 6 at 218 (emphasis added).
10342 U.S. 117 (1951), 37 IOWA L. Ray. 439 (1952), 6 MIAMI L.Q. 621
(1952).
11 Stefanelli N. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 125 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
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A departure from this policy in the Rea case may be justified on
three main grounds. First, it is a well settled principle of equity that
an injunction decree has only an in personam effect.12 Thus, the
decree in the instant case restrained only the action of the federal agent
and had no direct effect upon the criminal processes of the state.
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the property seized in the
instant case was contraband, which under federal statute is made
"subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United
States." 13 A third ground of justification is found in the inherent
exertions of authority
power of federal courts to check unreasonable
4
by federal law enforcement agencies.1
On the other hand, the Rea decision does run counter to certain
principles of equity and constitutional law. It is a familiar rule that
courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions. 15
This maxim ".

.

. is impressively reinforced when not merely the re-

lations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political
authorities are in issue." 16 Secondly, the Supreme Court has adhered
to the policy that federal courts will not intervene in state criminal
proceedings unless interference is necessary to prevent imminent irreparable injury, 17 or unless the defendant had taken advantage of
available state remedies.' 8 More pertinent to a consideration of the
issues discussed in this article, however, is the apparent contradiction
between the holding in the instant case and that in Wolf v. Colorado.19
There, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the exclusionary rule
is not applicable to state criminal proceedings.

12 See, e.g., Platt v. Woodruff, 61 N.Y. 378 (1875) ; Union Pac. R.R. v. Rule,
155 Minn. 302, 193 N.W. 161 (1923); Lord Portarlington v. Soulby, 3 Myl.
& K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40 (Ch. 1834); cf. J.R. v. M.P., Y.B. Hil. 37 Hen.
6, f. 13, pl. 3 (1459).
1328 U.S.C. §2463 (1952).
14 See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Wise
v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556 (1911); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) (dictum) ; United States v. Hee, 219 Fed. 1019, 1020 (1915) (dictum).
15 See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, supra note 11; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943).
16 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
17 See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, supra note 16, 37 IOWA L. REv. 439 (1952),
6 MIAMi L.Q. 621 (1952); Douglas v. Jeannette, supra note 15; Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935).
See also Cooper v. Hutchinson,
184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
IsSee, e.g., Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 221 (1956) (dissenting
opinion) ; Spielman Sales Motor Co. v. Dodge, supra note 17. See also Cooper
v. Hutchinson, supra note 17.
19338 U.S. 25 (1949); see Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Sei.ure,
Federalism, and the Cizil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1950).
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Wolf v. Colorado
In the Wolf case, the Supreme Court for the first time established
the rule that:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is
therefore implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty"
and as such enforceable
20
against the States through the Due Process Clause.

The Court pointed out that for a state to affirmatively sanction such
police incursion into privacy would be to run counter to the fourteenth
amendment. Thus, the fourth amendment was added to the list of
those provisions of the Bill of Rights which are essential to due process
of law and which bind the states through the operation of the fourteenth amendment. But Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
Court, reached the conclusion that the exclusion of evidence obtained
by unreasonable searches and seizures was not an essential ingredient
of the right guaranteed by the fourth amendment, so that the admission
of such evidence
in state courts was not barred by the application of
21
the fourteenth.
It is well settled that the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply
only to the federal government.
At the same time, the theory that
the language of the fourteenth amendment incorporates all the guarantees of these amendments, so as to restrain state action, has consistently been rejected.23 Rather, the Supreme Court has resorted to a
process of gradually determining what rights are contained therein.
The scope of the due process clause has been dependent upon the
applicable test of whether a particular right is basic to a free society
and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 24 Freedom of
20Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
21I. at 33. This conclusion was reached for the following reasons:

1. A majority of the states as well as most of the countries comprising the
United Kingdom at that time admitted evidence obtained through unlawful
searches and seizures. 2. The availability of other remedies in those states
which had rejected the "Weeks" doctrine. 3. The Court felt that the remedy
of exclusion was one designed to protect only the guilty. 4. The Court thought
that the reasons for excluding evidence obtained illegally by state or local police
were less compelling than those present in the case of violations by federal
officers because, "the public opinion of a community can far more effectively
be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible
to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought
to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country."
Id. at 32-33.
22 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Barron v. Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See also CUSHMAN, LEADING CoNsTITuIoNAL
DEcisioNs 61, 113 (10th ed. 1955); Note, The Right Of Privacy And Due
Process Of Law, 3 Bur'ALO L. Rav. 283, 292 (1954).
23 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Hurtado v. California. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
24 Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 22 at 325.
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religion,25 of speech 26 and of the press, 27 as well as the right to peaceable assembly 28 and the protection against the taking of property

without just compensation, 29 have been held applicable to the states.
On the other hand, the rights to indictment for felony, 30 confrontation

of witnesses in criminal cases, 31 jury trial in civil 32 and criminal
cases, 3 the privilege against self-incrimination 34 and the protection
against double jeopardy 35 have been considered not "basic," and thus
not entitled to protection against impairment by the states. The Wolf
case, in declaring the right guaranteed by the fourth amendment to
be enforceable against the states, became another link in the chain of
inclusion and exclusion. But, as expressed by Mr. Justice Murphy
in dissent, "it is difficult ... to understand how the Court ... [could]
go this far and yet be unwilling to make the step which . . . [could]
give some meaning to the pronouncements it [uttered] ....
Aftermath of the Wolf Case
Despite the holding in Wolf, the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence in state courts has been effected in one situation. In Rochin
37
v. California,
evidence obtained by local police through an unlawful
search and seizure accompanied by physical coercion was held to be
inadmissible in a state court. Rochin was convicted of possessing
narcotics in violation of the laws of California. The chief evidence
against him was two morphine capsules which he had swallowed after
police officers had broken into his home. The capsules were forcibly
extracted from his stomach through the use of an emetic solution
which produced vomiting. Mr. Justice Frankfurter described these
methods as being ". . . too close to the rack and the screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation." 38 Though he made no reference to
his recently expressed views in Wolf, he remarked that ". . . the Con25 See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
26 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) ; De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353 (1937) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
41 See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra note 26; Near v. Minnesota, supra note 26.
28 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, supra note 26; De Jonge v. Oregon, supra
note 26.
29 See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
30 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
31 See West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904).
32 See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
33 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900) (dictum).
34 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
35 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
36 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
37342 U.S. 165 (1952).
38 Id. at 172.
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stitution is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not
to maintain theories.' "39
The seeming inconsistency of the Wolf and Rochin cases was
reconciled in Irvine v. California.40 In that case, the Supreme Court
upheld a state court conviction which was obtained through the use of
illegally obtained evidence. After procuring a key to Irvine's home,
local police, on three separate occasions, entered it for the purpose of
installing and adjusting a microphone. From a nearby garage, they
listened to conversations of the defendant which were picked up by
the microphone. On the basis of information learned from these conversations, the defendant was arrested and incriminating evidence
found on his person was used at the trial over his objection. Mr.
Justice Jackson, who wrote the majority opinion, condemned the
police activity as "obnoxious." 41 He then restated the Court's position that the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence is not a basic
ingredient of the right protected by the fourth amendment; hence it
is not a mandate against the states by virtue of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. He distinguished the Rochin case on
the ground that it involved an element totally lacking in the present
case-coercion.
More pertinent to a clarification of the problem, however, were
the views of Mr. Justice Frankfurter who dissented. He felt that the
holding in the Wolf case should be limited to its facts; that case concerned a single instance of search and seizure. Conceding that the
present case involved no element of physical violence, he pointed out
that there was present ".

.

. however, a more powerful and offensive

control over the Irvines' life than a single, limited physical trespass." 42
He thought that exceptions to the Wolf rule should not be limited to
cases where the additional element was coercion but should rest on
previously determined tests of when due process is violated. Nevertheless, the outcome of the decided cases is that evidence obtained as
a result of physical trespasses to the person of the defendant by police
officers is not admissible in both state and federal courts, though
"governmental" trespasses to property, no matter how severe, will
result in exclusion of evidence, only in the federal courts.
Conflict of Views
The use of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations of
the fourth amendment has evoked sharp criticism from bench and
bar.43 A classic argument favoring admission of evidence illegally ob9Id. at 174 (emphasis added).

U.S. 128 (1954), 42 ILL. BAR J. 652 (1954), 39 IOWA L. REv. 676
(1954), 52 MicH. L. REv.904 (1954).
41 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954).
42 Id. at 145-46 (dissenting opinion).
43 See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S.
40347
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tained is premised upon the thought that the exclusion of such evidence
is in derogation of the common-law rule of admissibility of all relevant
and trustworthy evidence. 4 4 A further complaint is that it is inconsistent with the policy of allowing private litigants to use illegally obtained evidence. 45 In addition, it is argued that the question of the
evidence's illegal source is not germane to the issue at the trial, i.e., the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. 46 Exclusion is also said to be
inappropriate as a protection of constitutional guarantees, first, because
it protects only the guilty 47 and secondly, because it only indirectly
punishes the violator, 48 so that in the final analysis, only the public
suffers. From a policy standpoint exclusion is opposed on the ground
that its consequences are too far reaching; it enables the pettiest police
officer to confer immunity on a known offender. 49 At least one writer
believes that the exclusionary rule limits the deterrent effect of law
enforcement. 50 Others argue that there is no convincing proof that
5
it has actually tended to prevent unlawful searches and seizures. '
On the other hand, many have advanced arguments in support
of the exclusionary rule. 52 It is said that the protection afforded by
the fourth amendment would be worthless if illegally obtained evidence

See also authorities cited in Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence
657 (1926).
Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L.
REV.

565, 579 n.62 (1955).

44 See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 596 (1904) ; Commonwealth
v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,

282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955)

(dictum).

See Ray, Restrictions On The Use Of

Illegally Obtained Evidence, 9 Sw. L.J. 434 (1955); MACHEN, The Law Of
Search And Seizure, in LAW AND ADmimsmArAioN 146 (1950).
45 See People v. Defore, supra note 43 at 22, 150 N.E. at 588 (dictum)

People v. Cahan, supra note 44 at 910 (dictum).
46 See Adams v. New York, supra note 44 at 594. See also

MACHEN,

supra note 44, at 145; 8 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
47 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949) (dictum).
MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 146-47.
48 See also MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 44, at 147; 8 WIGMORE,

op. cit.

See also
EVIDENCE

§2183 (3d ed. 1940).
49

See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S.

657 (1926).
50 See Waite, Judges And The Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169, 186

(1955). ". . . [Ilt follows ineluctably that by every unnecessary limitation the
judges place on police efficiency, and by every discovered criminal they protect
from deserved punishment, those judges are derogating from the force of deterrence and contributing to the country's already too heavy and increasing

burden of crime." Ibid. In answer to the argument that the exclusionary rule

affords a shelter for criminals, Mr. Justice Jackson said, "... the forefathers
thought this was not too great a price to pay for that decent privacy of home,
papers and effects which is indispensable to individual dignity and self-respect."

Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
51 See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
52 See authorities cited in Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43

(1955).

CALIF.

L. REv. 565, 579 n.62
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were admissible; 53 the protection extends to all equally, the guilty as
well as the innocent.5 4 It is also asserted that when evidence is used
which has been obtained in a manner violative of the fifth amendment
as well as the fourth, the defendant is denied a fair trial.5 5 Further,
for a government to benefit from the lawlessness of its agents is said
to be opposed to the fundamental principle of justice that one should
not be permitted to profit from his own wrong. 56 Another argument
is that by receiving the fruits of unlawful searches, courts are sanctioning and participating in the illegal action; this is manifestly inconsistent with their duty to enforce the Constitution and the laws passed
pursuant thereto. 57 Finally, those who support the rule, believe it to
be the only effective method of deterring violations by the police 58
and that its efficacy in this respect has been considerable. 59
Origin and Development of the Exclusionary Rule
The constitutional protection of the right of privacy stems from
the common-law maxim that "every man's house is his castle." 60
More closely connected with its adoption, however, was the bitter resentment of the American colonists to the "writs of assistance." These
53 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 125 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also Scott, Federal
Restrictions On Evidence In State Criminal Cases, 34 MINN. L. REv. 489, 505
(1950).
54 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925); Weeks v.
United States, supra note 53.
55 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
56 See MACHEN, The Lw Of Search And Seizure, in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 143 (1950).
This principle was eloquently set forth by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in a dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928), where he said: "Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government
will be imperilled if it fails to observe the laws scrupulously. Our Government
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole
people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would
bring terrible retribution." Id. at 485 (dissenting opinion).
5 See Weeks v. United States, supra note 53; Barrett, Exclusiqn of Evidence
Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Caltn, 43 CALIF. L.
REv. 565, 579 (1955) ; MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 143-44. "If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business
it does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed." Olmstead v.

United States, supra note 56 at 470 (dissenting opinion, per Holmes, J.).
58 See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
See also
Barrett, supra note 57, at 584; MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 144.
59 See MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 149.
60 See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 265 (4th ed., Bruce 1931) ; CORNELIUS,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

§ 3 (1926);

CISIONS 86 (10th ed. 1955).

CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DE-
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were general warrants 61 under which British officers were liberally
granted power to search homes. 2 In 1761, James Otis vehemently
denounced these writs as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power
. ..that ... was [ever] found in an English lawbook." 63 Demands
for protection against the exercise of such arbitrary power 64 ultimately
resulted in the adoption of the fourth amendment. 65 Traditionally, the
rights secured by this amendment have been enforced in three ways. 66
op. cit. sunpra note 60, at 268-69.
op. cit. supra note 60, at 86; HART, FORMATION OF THE
UNION 1750-1829 53, 54 (rev. ed. 1926) ; KELLY & HARBISON, THE AaImEIcA"
CONSTITUTION 47 (1948); NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 209 (1922).
63 Quoted in 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMtITATIONS 615 (8th ed., Car61

See

COOLEY,

62

See

CUSHMAN,

rington 1927).

64 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886)
(dictum). The
memorable discussion by Lord Camden in the famous case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), is said to have provided the basis which
led to the adoption of the formal guarantees of the fourth amendment. The
plaintiff had brought an action for trespass against officers of the king who had
broken into his home and searched and examined his private papers. Later, the

secret information they contained was made public. The officers were acting
under the authority of a "general warrant." In pointing out that the acts complained of could only be justified under the mandate of some positive law, Lord
Camden remarked: "The great end, for which men entered into society, was to
secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all
instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for
the good of the whole.
"Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.
yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of
those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none; and therefore it is
too much for us without such authority to pronounce a practice legal, which
would be subversive of all the comforts of society." Id. at 1066.
Mr. Justice Bradley, in speaking of this case in Boyd v. United States.
supra, pointed out that: "as every American statesman, during our revolutionary
and formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and ultimate expression
of constitutional law, it may be confidently asserted that its propositions were
in the minds of those who framed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
and were considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures." Boyd v. United States, supra at 626-27. See also
COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 60, at 269.
65 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers.
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
66 See CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIzUIRE §§
MACHEN, The Law Of Search And Seizure,

230-57, 320-38, 360-61 (1926):
in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION

133-38 (1950); Grant, Circumventing The Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 359, 365 (1941). The Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure of
the California State Bar Association has suggested a novel remedy for viola-
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In addition to the exclusion of evidence, courts have provided redress
to injured parties by civil action in tort.67 Violators of the amendment have also been subjected to criminal penalties. 68
The use of the exclusionary rule as a method of enforcing the
fourth amendment was first employed by the Supreme Court in Boyd
v. United States. 9 In Adams v. New York, 70 however, the Court,
in refusing to follow the Boyd case, adhered to the common-law rule
that "evidence which is pertinent to the issue is admissible, although
it may have been procured in an irregular or even in an illegal
manner." 71 The present rule in the federal courts was not formulated
until 1914. In that year, the Supreme Court held in Weeks v. United
States 72 that evidence obtained by federal officers, in violation of the
fourth amendment, could not be used against an accused in a federal
court, if he made timely objection thereto. But the federal rule of
exclusion established in that case is not unlimited. If the defendant
waives his constitutional rights at the time the search is made, his
right to secure possession of the property or suppress its use in evitions of the right of privacy by police officers. ". . . [T]he answer might lie
in a new kind of civil action, or better, a summary type of proceeding, for a
substantial money judgment in favor of the wronged individual, whether innocent or guilty, and against the political subdivision whose enforcement officers
violated that person's rights. After not many outlays of public funds the taxpayers and administrative heads Would insist upon curbing unlawful police
action." 29 CALIF. ST. B.J. 263, 264 (1954). Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr.
of the University of California Law School believes that "legislative action
along these general lines gives promise of providing a more adequate solution
than the exclusionary rule at a smaller social cost." Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALF.
L. REv. 565, 595 (1955). He points out, however, that in their desire to make
the remedy attractive, legislators should not be unmindful of the dangers of
unjustified raids upon local treasuries. Ibid. See also Grant, supra at 372.
67 See Foote, Tort Remedies For Police Violations Of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
68 18 U.S.C. § 2234 (1952); cf. N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 1786, 1846-47; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-703 (1948) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 19-34 (1950).
See also Edwards,
Criminal Liability For UnreasonableSearches And Seizures, 41 VA. L. REv. 621
(1955).
69 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Boyd case involved the question of the constitutionality of a federal statute authorizing the courts to compel the producing
of a man's private books, papers, etc., under the penalty of having the facts
alleged as to the information they contained, be taken as confessed, if the defendant or witness failed to produce them. The statute was held violative of
the fourth and fifth amendments, and the introduction in evidence of books and
papers produced under such statute was declared error.
70 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
The Adams case involved an appeal from a conviction in a state court. Objection was made to the introduction in evidence of
certain private papers which were illegally seized by state police officers. The
Supreme Court upheld the state court conviction. Though not expressly overruling the Boyd case, the Court refused to apply it to the facts of the present
case.
71 Id. at 596.
72232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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dence is barred. 73 Generally, the defendant is required to make a
seasonable application before trial for the return or suppression of the
evidence.7 4 This is to prevent the interruption of the trial by a consideration of issues collateral to the question of the accused's guilt or
innocence. 75 This requirement of timely objection, however, is not
absolute. 76 It has not been applied where the defendant has no knowledge of the search and seizure prior to trial 7 or where he has
knowledge, but his counsel has failed to raise an objection.7" Since
exclusion is based upon the violation of personal rights guaranteed by
the constitution, standing to challenge the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence is personal.7 9 A caveat to this principle has been
recently provided by the Supreme Court in United States v. Jeffers.80
It was there said that "to hold that . . . [the unlawful search of a
third party's premises was] lawful as to the [defendant] . . . would

permit a quibbling distinction to overturn a principle which was designed to protect a fundamental right." 81
Another qualification of the rule of exclusion is the requirement
that the invasion of the constitutional right be "governmental." Thus,
where evidence is obtained as a result of an unlawful search and
seizure perpetrated by a private person, it is admissible, provided the
illegal acts were done without the knowledge or participation of the
government.8 2 In this connection, evidence is admissible in a federal
court when unlawfully obtained by non-federal officers acting completely independently of the federal government, if it is turned over
to federal officers on a "silver platter." 83 In holding this limitation
inapplicable, courts have condemned as "federal," unlawful searches
73 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. Barry, 260 Fed. 291 (S.D.N.Y.
1919) ; United States v. Gouled, 253 Fed. 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) ; see CORNELIUS,
SEIZURE § 17 (1926).
74 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34 (1925)

SEARCH AND

(dictum);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 396 (1914) (dictum); see CORNELIUS,
op. cit. supra note 73, § 10; MACHEN, The Law Of Search And Seizure, in LAW
AND ADMINISTRATION 137 (1950) ; Note, 45 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 51, 60 (1954).
75 See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Agnello v. United States,
supra note 74 at 34 (dictum) ; MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 74, at 137.
76"FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
77 Agnello v. United States, supra note 74 at 34.
78 United States v. Asendio, 171 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1948).
79 Steeber v. United States, 198 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1952); Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932) ; MacDaniel v. United States, 294 Fed. 769
(6th Cir. 1924); Remus v. United States, 291 Fed. 501, 510-11 (6th Cir. 1923)
(dictum).
80342 U.S. 48 (1951).

s1 Id. at 52.
82 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) ; see CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 14 (1926); MACHEN, The Law Of Search And Seizure, in LAW AND
ADMINISTRATION 137 (1950).
83 Burford v. United States, 214 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Rettich v. United
States, 84 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1936) ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79
(1949) (dictum); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (dictum).
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by state officers made at the request of federal officers 84 or participated in by the latter.8 5 In Lustig v. United States,8s the presence
of a United States Treasury agent in a room being unlawfully searched
by local police, and his selection of evidence deemed important for use
in a federal prosecution, were held not severable from the entire transaction in the room and therefore part of the unlawful search. In
addition, evidence that has been unlawfully obtained by state officers
for the sole purpose of enforcing federal law has been held to be
inadmissible in federal courts.87
Exclusionary Rule in States Courts
Safeguards similar to those contained in the fourth amendment
are found in every state's constitution.88 Upon the assumption that
the exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner violative of the fourth
amendment is not a federal constitutional mandate, the states have
felt free to implement their own constitutions by following or rejecting
the Weeks rule. At the present time, twenty-nine states 89 admit evi8
&Lustig v. United States, supra note 83 at 79 (dictum); see
op. 8cit. supra note 82, at 120.
5 Byars v. United States, supra note 83.

U.S. 74 (1949).

86338
87 Gambino

MACHEN,

v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927); United States v. Butler,
156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946).
88 See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; ARiz. CoxsT. art. 2, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. 2,
§ 15; CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 19; CoLo. CoNsr. art. II, § 7; CONN. CONsT. art. 1,
§ 8; DEL. CONsT. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CoNsT., Declaration Of Rights, § 22; GA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 2-116; IDAHO CONS. art. 1, § 17; IL.. CONsT. art. II, § 6;
IND. CoNs. art. 1, § 11; IoWA CONST. art. 1, § 8; KAN. CoNs., Bill Of Rights,
§ 15; Ky. CossT. § 10; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 7; ME. CoNs. art. 1, § 5; MD.
COST., Declaration of Rights, art. 26; MAss. CONST., Declaration of Rights,
art. XIV; MICH. CoNST. art II, § 10; MINN. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10; Miss. CoNsT.
art. 3, § 23; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 15; MONT. CossT. art. III, § 7; NEB. CoNsT.
art. I, § 7; N.H. CoNsT. pt 1, art. 19; N.J. CoNsT. art. 1, 7; N.M. CONsT.
art II, § 10; N.Y. CoNstr. art. I, § 12; NEv. CoNsT. art. 1, § 18; N.C. CoNsT.
art. I, § 15; N.D. CONST. § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 14; Oyi.A. CoNsT. art: II,
§ 30; ORM. CONsT. art. I, § 9; PA. CONsT. art 1, § 8; R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 6;
S.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16; S.D. CoNST. art. VI, § 11; TENNr. CONsT. art. 1, § 7;
TEx. CoNsT. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art I, § 14; VT. COsT. c. 1, art. 11;
VA. CoNs. art. 1, § 10; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CoNST. art. III, § 6;
Wis.
8 9 CONST. art. 1,§ 11; Wyo. CONST. art. 1, § 4.
See (Alabama) Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921) ; Shields
v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 85 (1894); (Arizona) Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz.
599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923) (by implication); (Arkansas) Benson v. State, 149
Ark. 633, 233 S.W. 758 (1921) ; Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S.W. 940
(1896) ; (Colorado) Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925);
(Connecticut) State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924);
(Delaware) State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 Atl. 212 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922);
(Georgia) Kennemer v. State, 154 Ga. 139, 113 S.E. 551 (1922) ; Calhoun v.
State, 144 Ga. 679, 87 S.E. 893 (1916) ; Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E.
624 (1897); (Iowa) State v. Rowley, 197 Iowa 977, 195 N.W. 881 (1923);
State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N.W. 530 (1923) ; (Kansas) State v. Johnson,
116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245 (1924) ; State v. Miller, 63 Kan. 62, 64 Pac. 1033
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dence though unlawfully seized. On the other hand, eighteen states 90
have expressed adherence to the exclusionary rule. Rhode Island,
the only state which has not directly passed upon the question, has
in a dictum assumed the applicability of the federal rule to the criminal proceedings of that state. 91 Three states have enacted legislation
which, in varying degrees, codify the principle established by the

(1901); (Louisiana) State v. Fleckinger, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922);
(Maine) State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 92 Atl. 867 (1915) ; (Maryland)
Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 141 Atl. 536 (1928) ; (Massachusetts) Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. 11 (1923); Commonwealth v.
Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841); (Minnesota) State v. Pluth, 157 ,Minn.
145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923); (Nebraska) Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 191
N.W. 721 (1923); (Nevada) State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798
(1924) ; (New Hampshire) State v. Agalos, 79 N.H. 241, 107 Ati. 314 (1919) ;
State v. Flynn, 36 N.H. 64 (1858) ; (New Jersey) State v. Black, 5 N.J. Misc.
48, 135 At. 685 (Q.S. 1926); (New Mexico) State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366,
281 Pac. 474 (1929) ; (New York) People v. Richter's Jewelers, Inc., 291 N.Y.
161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585,
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636
(1903), aft'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) ; (North Carolina) State v. Simmons, 183
N.C. 684, 110 S.E. 591 (1922); State v. Wallace, 162 N.C. 622, 78 S.E. 1
(1913); (North Dakota) State v. Fahn, 53 N.D. 203, 205 N.W. 67 (1925);
(Ohio)
State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936);
(Oregon) cf. State v. Folkes, 174 Ore. 568, 150 P.2d 17 (1944); (Pennsylvania) Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679 (1927) ; (South
Carolina) State v. Prescott, 125 S.C. 22, 117 S.E. 637 (1923) ; State v. Green,
121 S.C. 230, 114 S.E. 317 (1922) ; (Utah) State v. Aime, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac.
704 (1923); (Vermont) State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 160 At. 257 (1932);
(Virginia) Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154 (1924) ; Lucchesi
v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 872, 94 S.E. 925 (1918).
90 (California) People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955);
(Florida) Atz v. Andrews, 84 Fla. 43, 94 So. 329 (1922); (Idaho) State v.
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927) ; (Illinois) People v. Castree, 311
Ill. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924) ; (Indiana) Batts v. State, 194 Ind. 609, 144 N.E.
23 (1924); Flum v. State, 193 Ind. 585, 141 N.E. 353 (1923); Callender v.
State, 136 N.E. 10 (Ind. 1922); (Kentucky) Youman v. Commonwealth, 189
Ky. 152, 224 S.W. 860 (1920) ; (Michigan) People v. Margelis, 217 Mich. 423,
186 N.W. 488 (1922); People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N.W. 557
(1919); (Mississippi) State v. Patterson, 130 Miss. 680, 95 So. 96 (1923);
(Missouri) State v. Owens 302 Mo. 348, 259 S.W. 100 (1924); State v. Pope,
210 Mo. 558, 243 S.W. 2 53 (1922); (Montana) State ex rel. Thibodeau v.
District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924) ; State ex rel. King v. District
Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924) ; (Oklahoma) Hess v. State, 84 Okla.
73, 202 Pac. 310 (1921); Foster v. State, 27 Okla. Crim. 270, 226 Pac. 602
(1924); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Crim. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923); (South
Dakota) State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610 (1930) ; (Tennessee)
Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S.W. 588 (1922); (Texas) Burton v.
State, 152 Tex. Crim. 444, 215 S.W.2d 180 (1948) ; Timberlake v. State, 150
Tex. Crim. 375, 201 S.W.2d 647 (1947) ; (Washington) State v. Gibbons, 118
Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922); (West Virginia) State v. Wills, 91 W. Va.
659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922); State v. Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257
(1922); (Wisconsin) Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923);
(Wyoming) State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342 (1920).
91 See State v. Lorenzo, 72 R.I. 175, 48 A.2d 407, 412 (1946).
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NOTES
Under the Maryland statutes, exclusion is limited to

the trial of misdemeanors. 93 A more liberal attitude has been adopted
in North Carolina and Texas. North Carolina has statutorily barred
the use of evidence obtained by unlawful searches and seizures in
all criminal cases, 9 4 while under the Texas statute all illegal evidence, whether obtained by a police officer or a private person, is
inadmissible. 95

Though the "exclusion" states are in the minority, "the tide seems
to be flowing in that direction." 96 "Exclusion" has scored a great
victory through the recent change in attitude of California. That
state had for years consistently rejected judicial adoption of the Weeks
rule. 9 7 But in People v. Cahan,98 the Supreme Court of California

overruled long standing precedent by holding that evidence, seized by
local police after a forcible entry into the defendant's home without
a search warrant, was inadmissible. In an exhaustive opinion, the
court answered the argument that unreasonable searches and seizures

were justified because of the necessity of bringing criminals to justice,
by pointing out that the people of California had rejected this thought
by the adoption of constitutional provisions.9 9
Of greater import,
however, was this statement of the court's rationale:
We have been compelled to reach . . . [the] conclusion [that illegally obtained
evidence is inadmissible] because other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with
the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly
required to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law
enforcement officers.1 00

92 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (Supp. 1955) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27
(1953); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 727a (Supp. 1953).
93 MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (Supp. 1955).
04 "Any officer who shall sign and issue or cause to be signed and issued a
search warrant without first requiring the complainant or other person to sign
an affidavit under oath and examining said person or complainant in regard
thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered by reason of
the issuance of such illegal search warrant shall be competent as evidence in
the trial of any action: Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained
without a legal search warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall be competent as
evidence in the trial of any action." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1953).
95 "No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any
provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of this State
shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal
case."
TEx. CODE CRIer. PROC. ANN. art. 727a (Supp. 1953).
9
6 MCCORmiCK, EvIDENcE 295 (1954).
97 People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943) ; People v. Gonzales,
20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942) ; People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac.
435 (1922).
For the rule in California prior to the Weeks case, see People
v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909).
9844 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
99 Id. at 907.
0
'1 Id. at 911-12.
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Significantly, the court did not feel constrained to adopt the exclusionary rule because of the fact that the fourteenth amendment has
been held to restrain affirmative state action in violation of the fourth
amendment. Rather, in asserting its privilege to accept or reject the
rule, it decided as a matter of expediency to make that remedy available. Since the evils prevailing in California prior to the decision
in the Cahan case 101 are not confined to that state, it is possible that,
quite aside from any constitutional considerations, the change in policy
manifested by this case may cause a re-evaluation of the problem in
other jurisdictions.
Conclusion
Barring this possibility, it is at least apparent that the decision
in the Rea case has effectively limited the rule formulated in Wolf.
A remedy is now furnished, which, in effect, imposes the exclusionary
rule on state courts when the evidence has been obtained through
unlawful searches and seizures by federal officers. It is hoped that
the instant case will provide the basis for a future departure from the
narrow formula set forth in Wolf. 10 2

The application of the exclu-

sionary rule on a "national" rather than a "federal" basis would
equate the protection of the right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth
and fourteenth amendments. Furthermore, imposition of the exclusionary rule on state courts would provide uniformity of remedy for
the violation of a constitutional right, the protection of which is guaranteed against infringement by the states as well as the federal government. Thus, the practical value of the right will not be made to
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the violation occurs or where
the accused is being tried. Were the exclusionary rule held applicable
to prosecutions in state courts, it is evident that those courts would
be forced to provide a clearer explanation of the rules applicable to
"probable cause," the issuance of warrants, and search incident to a
lawful arrest. Such a result would protect both
individual rights and
10 3
the interest of society in suppressing crimes.
Various methods have been suggested by which the exclusionary
rule could be imposed upon state courts. It is conceded that Congress
could make the rule binding upon the states in order ".

.

. to deter

state invasions of the fourth amendment's guarantee, which is now
recognized as limiting state as well as federal action." 104 However,
political reasons reduce the possibility of this step being taken. It
therefore depends upon the Supreme Court, which is perhaps farther
removed from the pressures of public opinion, to provide the solution.
10, Barrett, Exchsion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment
CALIF. L. Rlv. 565, 568-78 (1955).

on People vs. Cahan, 43
102
103
104

See Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 221 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
Barrett, supra note 101, at 578.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 908 (1955).
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This may be accomplished by a direct overruling of the Wolf case
through a holding that the exclusion of evidence is an essential ingredient of the right of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment.105 Without directly overruling Wolf, the Court could reexamine the scope of the due process clause and include within it a
bar to the use of illegally obtained evidence. Since "basic rights do
not become petrified as of any one time," 106 and since "it is of the
very nature of a free society to advance in its standards of what
is deemed reasonable and right," 107 this solution is not without
justification.
But the "national" protection of the right of privacy by the exclusion of evidence may require a departure from the sources tapped
in previous investigations of the problem. In this connection, the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment may
provide a fertile field for future consideration. Assuming that the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in federal courts is a privilege
afforded every citizen of the United States, an argument could be
made that the admission of such evidence in state courts is an unconstitutional abridgement of that privilege. Since other remedies do
not appear to provide adequate protection, the imposition of the
exclusionary rule on the state level would seem to be necessary.

X
TiiE HOOVER REPORT- PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN REQUIRED
ADmINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
One of the most pressing problems in administrative law is that
of procedural due process in administrative hearings. The remedial3
Administrative Procedure Act 2 has provided only a limited solution.
105 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462-63 (1928) (dictum) ;
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 48 (1948) (dissenting opinion). See also
MACHEN, The Law Of Search And Seizure, in LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 144
(1950).
10 See Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 105 at 27.
107 Ibid.
I See GEULHORN AND BysF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 715-22 (1954) ; ATTORNEY
GENERAL, MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Act 6 (1947); ComMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
REPORT To THE CONGRESS ON LEGAL SERvIcEs AND PROCEDURE 45-46 (1955)
(hereinafter referred to as COMMISSION REPORT).
260 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1952).
3

See

CONMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE

GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERvicEs AND PROCEDURE 137-43
(1955) (hereinafter referred to as TASK FORCE REPORT). Schwartz, The Ad-

ininistrative Procedure Act In Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1173 (1954).

